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Based on joint work with John M. Abowd and Ian M. Schmutte
administrative data in the infrastructure of 
official statistics
•Back to the 1960s – frames, if not surveys
•Motivation behind Fellegi’s original work
•Today not just frame but data source
• European censuses based on administrative data
• US business registers used for Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), County 
Business Patterns
•New sources emerging (health, education, law)
rich new analysis and publications
held back by concerns of citizens 
and businesses about privacy
privacy concerns
• 1960s in the US: proposal for “National Data Bank” with the goal of 
combining survey and administrative data to make available to 
researchers
• Instead, and partially as a consequence, privacy laws were formalized in the 
1970s (“Privacy Act 1974” (Public Law 93-579, 5 U.S.C. § 552a)) specifically 
prohibited “matching” programs, linking data from different agencies. 
• More recently: 2016 Australian Census elicited substantial 
controversy 
• Identifiable data with explicit goal of enabling linkages between the census 
and administrative data, as well as linkages across historical censuses
current state of protection mechanisms
• Public-use files and tabulations, created using 
techniques developed for survey files
• Suppression
• Coarsening
• swapping
• noisy queries (input and output)
• Limited utility for “thin tails” (or thin distributions)
• Business data
• But more generally “rare data”
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focus
I will focus on access 
mechanisms for 
researchers
I will exclude
• Newer mechanisms to create 
tabular data (synthetic data, 
differentially-private data)
Source:  (Fox News/REUTERS/Kacper Pempel/Files/https://goo.gl/ZHMkog)
newer methods: Data Enclaves 
• custom tabulations (by staff) became too onerous
• tabulation and analysis work offloaded onto researchers by providing 
them with access to protected microdata
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access methods: enclaves
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Thin client
RDC
Remote 
desktop
Remote 
execution Submitting analysis programs by 
email or through website, with 
manual disclosure avoidance (DA)
(possibly combined with synthetic 
microdata)
Software on your own PC giving a 
view onto secure data 
environment, with manual DA
Privacy   loss
Secondary secure PC giving a view 
onto secure data environment, 
with manual DA
thin clients
• With the notable exception of the Canadian RDCs (for now), thin 
clients are the preferred method of access
• Surrounded by walls = RDC [FSRDC in US, Germany, others]
• Embedded in a managed device = “thin client” [above, plus France]
• Software with a managed access token = “remote desktop” or “VDI” [some US 
agencies; DK, Finland]
• Additional controls may be
• IP address control [many]
• Biometric authentication [France]
• Smart card [France, US]
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trust and access
• Frequent discussion
• Security measures are for (malevolent) intruders/opponents
• Researchers are trusted collaborators…
• … who know what they are doing
• A corollary:
• Protect against the bad guys
• But let the “good” guys do their thing
• Examples:
• Network-moderated access
• Contracts with disclosure avoidance rules
• Danish remote access with researcher-controlled release of results and authorized 
establishments
How do you 
know who the 
good guys are?
Also known as the 
“old boys’ network”
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hidden element: how is Disclosure Avoidance done?
• Most access methods:
• Enforcing minimum count of entities in a statistic (coefficient, mean, stddev)
• Prohibiting creation of tabular data (or making it very expensive)
• (Vain) attempt at tracking overlapping releases
• Automated systems
• Tracking of cells, implementation of (randomized) rounding, suppression, (output) 
noise infusion (StatCan, ABS)
• Similar in CB’s Microdata Analysis System/Automated Query System
• Newer mechanisms
• Noise infusion upon computation
• Differentially-private output perturbation (of model-based statistics, incl. coefficients 
and expected counts)
hidden cost: managing the network
• Categorizing access requests
• What is an authorized institution? [Eurostat: recognized research entity]
• Framework contracts with each institution
• Managing access requests
• Ideally, that’s a problem you would like to have
• Training [France: 3h enrollment sessions], managing access tokens, [physical thin clients]
• Cost? [France: itemized price list]
• Disclosure avoidance
• Bottleneck – ideally primary function of designated staff
• Training of users important [Based on our survey of 100 US FSRDC users]
• Provision of tools important
• Enforcement (in particular for self-disclosure)
natural economies of scale
• Increasing emphasis on consolidation of (national) networks
• US Census Bureau’s Research Data Centers (since 1990s) now Federal 
Statistical Research Data Centers (FSRDC) with 8 new federal partners
• France Centre d’accès sécurisé aux données (CASD) provides access to data 
from more than 15 national entities, including health-admin data
• Some Canadian RDCs also providing access to provincial data
• Secondary research benefit
• Ability to break out of data silos
summary
• Many more tools today than in the past
• Remote access of some type is the standard practice around the 
world
• Disclosure avoidance is still quite pedestrian in almost all cases
• Newer methods are being developed, but few access mechanisms 
(proposed or implemented) successfully combine ability to estimate 
arbitrary models with robust (provable) protection 
mechanisms
p.s. one last thing
• Replicability is a nascent problem
• More and more journals require provable replicability
• Cannot be satisfied with idiosyncratic access 
mechanisms
• Some research with confidential files will lose
(reputable) publication outlets
• Transparency critical
• Need capability to be able to archive
research files within secure enclaves
• Need ability to publically identify such files 
(documentation) [DDI, DOI]
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